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Abstract
We analyze the impacts of capital market integration on the skill composition of labor, using a
framework in which heterogeneous agents decide to invest in the acquisition of skills and
where production exhibits increasing returns in the available skill range (i.e., capital-skill
complementarity).
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Following the deepening integration of international capital markets, a huge number of stud-
ies have analyzed its eﬀects on competition for scarce capital and governments’ ﬁscal behavior
(e.g., Wilson, 1999; Zodrow, 2003; Wildasin and Wilson, 2004). Also, its impacts on indus-
trial agglomeration and the pattern of trade have been examined (e.g., Krugman, 1980;
Ottaviano and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele,
2005). The purpose of the present paper is to investivates its eﬀects on agents’ incentives to
acquire skills and, therefore, on the skill composition of the workforce, an aspect that has
been neglected until now in the existing literature.1
Empirical evidence on skill composition presented by Barro and Lee (2001, Table 3) re-
veals that the gap between the skilled labor shares of developed and of developing countries
has signiﬁcantly increased in recent years. Most of the literature has attributed this evolu-
tion to the so-called ‘brain drain’, i.e., the international migration of skilled workers from
developing to developed countries (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2004, for a recent overview).
While this is doubtlessly an important part of the explanation, two points suggest that it
may not be the whole story. First, even if the ‘brain drain’ has increased signiﬁcantly since
the 1970s, skilled labor mobility remains low when compared to the international ﬂows of
goods and capital. Second, standard theory predicts that skilled labor migration, by increas-
ing supply and decreasing its returns in the host country, should reduce the incentives for
further skill formation there (Borjas, 1999). When taken together, these two points suggest
that skilled labor migration may not be the main explanation for the growing skill gap.
Our paper suggests that the increasing integration of capital markets and the presence of
capital-skill complementarities may serve to explain this apparent puzzle. We show that the
growing integration of capital markets, and hence, competition for capital in the presence
of heterogeneous skilled workers, may provide an alternative explanation for the widening of
the international skill gap. Focusing on the extreme case in which there is no international
migration at all, we show that the well-documented capital-skill complementarities may lead
to a ‘brain drain’ without migration. The intuition underlying this result is as follows. When
capital and skilled labor are complementary, capital will ﬂow to skilled labor abundant
countries. In doing so, it expands the range of available skills there, which raises the payoﬀ
to the unskilled of getting trained, because of increasing returns in the range of skills. This
then entices additional unskilled workers to acquire skills, triggering further capital ﬂows.
Our main result establishes that capital market integration leads to a reallocation of capital
from the ‘small’ to the ‘large’ country, which widens the international gap in skilled labor
shares. Hence, even in the complete absence of migration, the small country loses skilled
workers due to a deepening integration of the capital market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
1Yet, see Sato and Thisse (2005) for an analysis of the impacts of capital market integration on skill
mismatch
1Section 2.1, we analyze the autarky case, and in Section 2.2 we turn to the case of capital
market integration. Section 3 ﬁnally concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider an economy with a mass N ≡ U + S of workers, where U and S denote the
mass of the unskilled and of the skilled, respectively. Each agent (skilled and unskilled) is
endowed with one unit of his labor type and with one unit of capital. All factors are supplied
inelastically. Unskilled labor is perfectly homogeneous, whereas skilled labor consists of a
continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated types (think, e.g., of specialized tasks). We denote
by f the distribution of skill types, with support on [0,S]. We assume, for simplicity, that
skills are uniformly distributed: f(j)=1 /S for all j ∈ [0,S]. The aggregate production
















where K stands for the total capital input; Lu stands for the total input of unskilled labor;
ls(j) stands for the skilled labor input per worker of type j; α, β,a n dγ are positive constants
satisfying 0 < α,β,γ < 1 and γ ≡ 1 − α − β;a n dξ > 0 denotes the economy’s total factor
productivity (henceforth, TFP). It is readily veriﬁed that this production function exhibits
constant returns to scale in input quantities but increasing returns to scale in the range of
varieties of skilled labor (e.g., Ethier, 1982). It can also be veriﬁed that, for a given mass of
skilled labor S,e ﬃciency requires the ﬁrm to use all skill types in the same quantity. Hence,
ls(j)=ls for all j.
In what follows, we assume that the ﬁnal good is produced under perfect competition and
sold in a perfectly competitive world market. We choose it as the numéraire and normalize its
price to one. Let wu, ws and r stand for the skilled and unskilled wages, and the rental rate
of capital, respectively. Given symmetry in skilled labor inputs, the ﬁrst-order conditions for
proﬁt maximization, combined with the labor market clearing conditions Lu = U and ls =1
(because all labor types are supplied inelastically) yields
wu = βξK
αU





Conditions (2) highlight the external eﬀect of a larger range of skilled labor types: unskilled
w a g e si n c r e a s ei nS, because a larger skill range raises unskilled productivity. The presence
of such Marshallian externalities has been repeatedly highlighted in the theoretical and
empirical literature.2 Note also that skilled labor and capital are complementary. In what
2Horizontal skill heterogeneity is known to lead to increasing returns with respect to the labor pool, which
is considered as being one of the most important features of skills (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2000). See also
Duranton and Puga (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004), for an application to the urban context.
2follows, we assume that α < 1/2, i.e., the capital-skill complementarity is not too strong.3
Agents decide on whether or not to invest in the acquisition of skills, i.e., the distribution
of total population N between skilled S and unskilled U is endogenously determined. To
keep things simple, we assume that an unskilled worker v can become skilled by incurring
once a ﬁxed training cost c(v) ∈ [0,1].T h i s t r a i n i n g c o s t d i ﬀe r sa c r o s sa g e n t s ,w h oa r e
heterogeneous in terms of their ability to get trained. We further assume that training costs
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1].D e n o t e b y c the cut-oﬀ level of training
costs, i.e, workers with training costs c(v) <c(resp., c(v) ≥ c) become skilled (resp., remain
unskilled). Hence, the number of workers who become skilled and who remained unskilled
are given by S = cN and U =( 1− c)N, respectively.
The equilibrium value of c, denoted by c∗, will of course be determined by arbitrage





Inserting the expressions S = cN and U =( 1−c)N into (2), we obtain the factor prices ws,





































Substituting these wages ws and wu into (3) and rearranging it, we get:
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The equilibrium rate of skill formation c∗ then solves (6).
3This is a suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium to exist under capital market integration.
32.1 Autarky
Let us start with the autarky equilibrium. In that case, the country’s available capital stock
is solely determined by its endowments, i.e., K = N. From condition (4), the rental rate of
capital then becomes:
r = ξα(1 − c)
βcN
α+β. (7)
Substituting (7) into (6), and rearranging, we get
Γ(c) ≡
c(1 − c)1−β
(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)c
= ξN
α+β. (8)
One can readily verify that
dΓ
dc
> 0w h e nc<c ≡
1 − α − β
1 − α
,
and that equation (8) has a unique solution c∗ ∈ (0,c). It is further be readily veriﬁed from
conditions (7) and (8) that c∗ (·) and r∗ (·) satisfy
ξN






















Since ξNα+β can roughly be interpreted as the country’s size in terms of labor ‘eﬃciency
units’, we see that in autarky larger countries (as measured in ‘eﬃciency units’) have a
higher rate of skill formation and a higher rental rate of capital.T h i sl a s te ﬀect stems from
the fact that the productivity of capital is higher in the larger country, due to the capital-skill
complementarity, which raises its equilibrium returns.
Proposition 1 (autarky) In autarky, larger countries have a higher equilibrium rate of
skill formation and a higher rental rate of capital.
2.2 Capital market integration
Assume that there are two countries with total masses of workers N1 and N2,a n dT F Pξ1
and ξ2, respectively. All other parameters are common to the two countries. Without loss





2 . This assumption encompasses the following two scenarios:
(i) First, the case in which ξ1 = ξ2 = ξ can be interpreted as both countries having access
to the same technology, which may be seen as a characteristic feature of the developed
world. We refer to this case as ‘North-North’ scenario, and our size assumption implies that
N1 >N 2.
4(ii) Second, the case in which ξ1 > ξ2 can be interpreted as country 1 having access





2 , this setting seems realistic when interpreting country 1 as the developed
world (‘North’) and country 2 as the developing world (‘South’). North has an overall larger
labor supply, as measured in eﬃciency units, although South has a larger total population.
W er e f e rt ot h i sc a s ea st h e‘ N o r t h - S o u t h ’s c e n a r i o .
To focus solely on the impacts of capital market integration, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that both skilled and unskilled workers are immobile, i.e., there is no international
migration. In this respect, we move away from classical ‘brain drain’ aspects in which skilled
workers are internationally mobile (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004).
Assume that capital markets are integrated, so that capital may ﬂow freely between
the two countries. Arbitrage then implies that there is a common equilibrium rental rate
r.4 Equating the demand for capital in both countries, obtained from condition (5), to the
world capital supply K1 + K2 = N1 + N2 yields the following market clearing condition:


































Skill formation is governed as before by the condition wui+ci = wsi which, using expressions





















[(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)c2]
1/(1−α) (11)
Conditions (10) and (11) can be solved for the rates of skill formation c1 and c2 as a function
of r, which then allows us to solve for r∗ using (9). Let ra
1 and ra
2 stand for the autarky
rental rates of capital. In the Appendix, we prove the following result:
Proposition 2 (integration) When α < 1/2, there exists a unique equilibrium such that
ra
2 <r ∗ <r a




2, i.e., the two countries diverge in terms of
their skilled labor shares.
4Stricly speaking, this only holds for an interior equilibrium involving a positive share of capital in both
countries. Given our production function, this will always be the case since the marginal productivity of
capital is inﬁnite at zero.
5Proposition 2 shows that capital mobility leads to capital export from the small to the
large country, thereby raising the skilled labor share in the latter and reducing it in the
former. Thus, capital market integration in the presence of capital-skill complementarities
has the same eﬀect on skilled shares than the ‘brain drain’, even when skilled labor is
internationally immobile.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
We analyzed the impacts of capital market integration on skill formation in the presence of
horizontally heterogeneous skills and capital-skill complementarities. In autarky, the large
country has a higher skilled labor share than the small country which, due to capital-skill
complementarities, leads to a higher autarky rental rate of capital in the large country.
Therefore, when capital markets become internationally integrated, capital moves from the
small to the large country. This reallocation modiﬁes the payoﬀs to the acquisition of skills,
thereby increasing the skilled labor share in the large country and decreasing that same
share in the small country. Hence, capital mobility may be an important explanation of the
growing skill gap since it gives rise to a ‘brain drain’ without migration.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let ci ≡ ci(r) stand for the solution to (10) and (11). Clearly
lim
r→0ci =
1 − α − β
1 − α
> 0a n d l i m
r→+∞ci =0 .














(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)ci
¸
.
It can be readily veriﬁed that




(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)ci
< 0.
which, together with α < 1/2, establishes that dci/dr<0.
7Substituting ci = ci(r) into (9), we obtain an equation that can be solved for the equi-

















Since Λ1(0) > 0, Λ2(0) > 0,a n dlimr→∞ Λ1 =l i m r→∞ Λ2 =0 , the existence of a unique value
r∗ is guaranteed. Note further that, since (7) implies that ra
2 <r a
1, only three cases may
arise: (i) r∗ <r a
2 <r a
1;o r( i i )ra
2 <r a
1 <r ∗; or (iii) ra
2 <r ∗ <r a
1. We now show that cases
(i) and (ii) are impossible. Thus, since an equilibrium exists when α < 1/2, case (iii) must
hold.
Assume that (i) holds. Since the skill formation conditions (10) and (11) hold under





















































































which proves that this case cannot arise either. Existence of an equilibrium then makes sure
that case (iii) must hold.
Finally, since dci/dr<0, ra
1 >r ∗ implies that c∗
1 >c a
1 and r∗ >r a
2 implies that ca
2 >c ∗
2,
which proves our result.
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